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                                                                    Abstract 
      
Politicians and political parties are faced with the problem of being elected to 
power, and later, of being re-elected. These political ambitions are often fuelled by 
policies that affect the entire economy and business cycles. The purpose of this 
paper is to compare the various models used to describe how political decision-
making may affect business cycles. Both opportunistic and partisan models, and 
exchange rate manipulation are examined, and empirical evidence is used to view 
the validity of the models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, business cycles have been explained by economic fluctuations caused by random 
shocks and structural instability of economy. They move in a cyclical manner, each boom followed 
by a bust, each expansion of the economy traced by an anticipated and inevitable downturn. 
Although there have been those who believe in mankind’s ability to come up with tools to break the 
cycles (e.g., Irving Fisher’s claim on the eve of the 1929 crash that stock prices had reached a 
“permanent and high plateau”), such methods have not been developed (De Long, 1999). 
Expansions always end. They are followed by recessions in which patterns of real, nominal and 
financial variables closely resemble the ideal type of “recession”. In this sense, business cycles 
follow a cyclical motion. 
 
An alternative way of viewing business cycles is to consider them being politically determined. 
According to this view, the root cause for some of the business cycles lies in political motivation. 
First formalized by Nordhaus (1975), the theory of political business cycles assumes that 
politicians, once in power, are eager to stay in power. To do this, they may be tempted to 
manipulate economic policy instruments for electoral gains. 
 
To describe the phenomenon, several models have been developed. These models can be divided 
into two main groups, the opportunistic and partisan models (Alesina & Roubini, 1992). In 
opportunistic models, policy makers maximize their popularity or their probability of being re-
elected. This is assumed to be the only thing they care about, and they will go to great lengths to 
appear more competent than their opposition, resulting in being re-elected. According to Nordhaus 
(1975), a common way to do this is by changing the location on the Phillips curve, where there is a 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Voters form expectations of what is usual behaviour 
of political parties. This is based on past behaviour. The expectation is then compared to the 
behaviour and performance of the incumbent party, and the voter then decides who to vote for. In 
partisan models, different political parties vary in their policy options and priorities, and make 
decisions that are more favourable to some groups than others. Alesina and Roubini (1992) suggest 
that left-wing parties are more concerned with solving the unemployment problem whereas the 
right-wing parties focus more on inflation issues. Traditional examples include the Democrats 
versus Republicans in the United States, and Labour versus Conservatives in the United Kingdom. 
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Developments in the study of political business cycles have taken place in phases. The first phase 
started in the 1970s and was led by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) on opportunistic cycles, 
and Hibbs (1977) on partisan cycles. Due to research trends in macroeconomics, political business 
cycles were forgotten for some years. In the mid-80s, interest in them was renewed, and through the 
use of game theory new approaches were developed. During this second phase, rational political 
business cycle models were developed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990). These models are of opportunistic nature, 
i.e., they assume that incumbent policy makers want to stay in power. Formulated at around the 
same time, the so-called rational partisan theory developed by Alesina (1987) takes a partisan 
approach. 
 
In addition to these models, some attention has been given to the use of exchange rates in meeting 
political goals. Exchange rates can be manipulated in a similar way as the inflation rate and 
unemployment as mentioned above. However, the exchange rates have some benefits as the effects 
tend to be more immediate. For instance, an appreciation of the exchange rate immediately cuts 
import prices and consumers’ prices, thus immediately boosting real income (van der Ploeg, 1989). 
Dornbusch (1987) suggests this is one of the best tricks in the bag of an incumbent policy maker, 
and that there exists empirical evidence of this. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce and compare the most important models regarding political 
business cycles. The next section describes the opportunistic (political business cycles and rational 
business cycles) and partisan (partisan and rational partisan) models as well as the exchange rate 
policy. In section 3. attention is given to some empirical evidence of various countries. Section 4. 
summarizes the paper. 
 
2. Theories n Political Business Cycles 
2.1 Political Business Cycles 
The framework introduced in this section follows Nordhaus (1975). Conventional wisdom states 
that there is a trade-off between the rates of inflation and unemployment (as in the Phillips curve). 
The reason for this is that a low unemployment rate means higher demand relative to the labour 
force and a higher cost of strikes. Because of this, workers are prepared to settle for a higher than 
average increase in wage rates. In addition, the trade-off is larger in the short term than in the long 
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term. Higher inflation leads to an expectation of even higher inflation in the future. Nordhaus 
assumes that inflation is a control or policy variable of the economic system and that policy are able 
to set it at any desired level. Therefore, the problem is to determine what that desired level is. The 
economy is described by a Phillips curve (Alesina & Roubini, 1992): 
 
     1 ( )
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where  is unemployment, u )1/( α−u  is the steady state “natural” level of unemployment, π  is 
inflation, eπ  is expected inflation; ε  is a random shock with zero mean, α  and γ  are parameters. 
The autoregressive term in (1) captures the sources of persistence. It is worth noting that it is 
possible to use output growth, , instead of unemployment. This is due to Okun’s law. ty
 
Individual decision-makers have included the aggregate inflation and unemployment rates in their 
preference functions, and prefer lower rates of each to the higher ones. Individuals care about the 
aggregate unemployment rate because their own experiences are closely linked to the cyclical 
movements of the economy. Rising unemployment rates often mean decreasing income for many 
families. Although not as obvious, individuals are also averse to inflation. Nordhaus lists three 
common reasons for this. First, inflation may cause balance of payments problems. Second, it leads 
to inefficient allocation of resources. Third, inflation introduces an arbitrary redistribution of 
income. 
 
As individuals are unable to say whether or not political decision-makers are performing well 
relative to objective possibilities, they rely on past experience and observations when deciding who 
to vote. Nordhaus claims, that voters do not take the platforms of parties seriously when voting. 
Instead, they form a set of expectations of what is the usual behaviour of political parties. In 
Nordhaus’ model, a great amount of importance is placed on the assumption that voters are ignorant 
to the structure of the economy. They only look back at the incumbent party’s performance and 
decide whether to vote for them (improved economic conditions) or against them (deteriorated 
conditions). Thus the expectations on inflation are adaptive: 
 
                    1 1( )
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Knowing this, the incumbent party makes decisions regarding the economy. It is important to point 
out that policymakers are directly in control of the inflation. According to Nordhaus’ model, the 
incumbent is myopic in that it does not care about the future generations. It only aims to stay in 
power by pleasing the present voters. In a two-party system with periodic voting, the short-term 
economic policies are chosen by the incumbent party. The incumbent eliminates the inflationary 
effects at the beginning of its new term with the use of a recession (Alesina & Sachs, 1988). 
 
2.2. Rational Political Business Cycles 
The original model was proposed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) but later revised and simplified by 
Persson and Tabellini (1990). The approach used here can be found in Carlsen (1997a). The rational 
political business cycle model is a two-period signalling game in which the policymaker sets the 
inflation tπ  for each period . Given the inflation, output  is 2,1=t tx
   
                       ,et t t tx π π μ= − +    ,2,1=t                          (3) 
 
where tμ  is the policymaker’s “competence”. Instead of using the adaptive inflation expectations, 
as in Nordhaus (1975), the rational political business cycle model uses rational expectations: 
 
                                                 (4) )|( 1−= ttet IE ππ
 
1−tI  includes all the necessary information except the level competence of the policymakers. This 
implies asymmetric information between the candidates and the voters (Alesina & Roubini, 1992). 
The former are aware of their own type (or competence) whereas the latter do not. Here competence 
is understood to mean the ability to reach and maintain a low unemployment level together with a 
relatively low inflation rate. Politicians attempt to appear as competent as possible before elections, 
eventually leading to a situation that resembles Nordhaus’ political business cycles. High (low) 
competence politicians have a higher (lower) willingness to spend. Competence itself is not 
observable before the elections but the spending is observable. The rationality of the voters and the 
two period setting limit the politicians’ opportunistic behaviour, which causes the cycles to be 
shorter and less regular than in Nordhaus’ model. 
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The policymaker of period 1 is referred to as the incumbent who will face competition at the 
elections before period 2. The winner will be in power thereafter. In order for the incumbent to have 
an incentive to manipulate the economy, the output  must be observable to the voters whereas 
inflation 
1x
1π  remains unobserved by the electorate until the beginning of period 2. The competences 
of both parties are drawn from a uniform probability distribution: 
 
                             
0
0
H
c
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,         (5) 
 
with  occurring with probability Hμ ρ  and  with probability Lμ ρ−1 , with 10 << ρ . Neither the 
voters nor the other candidate observe the competence of a candidate. The ability of the voters to 
determine if  reflects the incumbent’s true competence depends on whether the equilibrium is of 
the separating or pooling type. In the separating equilibrium, competent and incompetent 
incumbents choose different output levels in the first period. In the event of a pooling equilibrium, 
incumbents of both levels of competence will choose the same level of output in the first period. 
However rational and forward-looking voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their utility in 
period 2. For the incumbent, the optimal policy reflects the trade-off between a higher probability of 
re-election and a reduced social welfare by generating a political business cycle. It is important for 
the incumbent to consider the consequences of the manipulation of its policies. If they are 
excessive, the incumbent may end with a reputation of being cynical and irresponsible, thus 
harming its attempts to be re-elected. 
1x
 
2.3.  The Partisan Model 
The partisan model by Hibbs (1977) is also concerned with the Phillips curve (1) and views that 
political parties are placed on different parts of the curve, depending on their policies. In fact, as 
opposed to the political business cycle model, the partisan model states that politicians maximise 
different objective functions. This is in contrast with the political business cycle model in which 
politicians are opportunistic and only aim to stay in office. Out of all the differences between the 
two models, this is the most significant.  
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According to Hibbs, left-wing parties traditionally focus on unemployment whereas right-wing 
parties are more concerned about the inflation rate. The parties are seen to represent different 
constituencies with different preferences. The right-wing party tends to please the upper middle 
class, the business and financial community. The left-wingers, on the hand, serve the needs of the 
lower middle class and the unions. Inflation and unemployment have distributional consequences 
that help explain these differences. 
 
In the partisan model, voters are aware of the differences between the parties and vote according to 
how closely the parties’ policies resemble their own preferred outcome. Knowing this, 
policymakers choose their policies deterministically depending on the voters’ demands (Alesina et 
al., 1997). 
 
2.4. Rational Partisan Model 
Alesina (1987 and 1988) adopts a view that different parties have different preferences regarding 
the intristic properties of their economic policies, in a similar way as in the partisan model by 
Hibbs. In other words, the parties are policymakers with separate objective functions: 
 
    2 2
0
[ ( ) ( ) ],Ti t i i it ttW c b uδ π== − − − −∑ K 1,0 δ< <   (6) 
 
where  identifies the political tendency of the party (i.e., left or right). Some generalizations 
of the parties’ political motivations can be characterised by at least one of the following 
inequalities: 
RLi ,=
 
      ;0≥> RL cc ;0≥> RL bb .
1
L R uK K α< ≤ −   (7) 
 
It is assumed that the parties care about the effects of their policies and that the parties have 
differing objectives and incentives. 
 
In Alesina’s model there are two parties that alternate in office, and unlike in the partisan model by 
Hibbs, analysis is done in the context of game theory, similar to that of Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). The two parties treat unemployment and inflation as 
 6
economic “bads” – the weights depending on the objectives of the party. Equilibrium results from 
the fluctuations in output and inflation connected with the political cycle. The two parties are short-
sighted. However, it differs from Nordhaus’ model in that it does not rely on backward looking 
expectations or misinformation of voters. Voters are assumed to be rational. The central idea of the 
rational partisan model is that in an economy with sluggish wage adjustments, the changes in the 
inflation rates associated with changes in government create temporary deviations of real economic 
activity from its natural level. One of the underlying assumptions is that labour contracts are signed 
at discrete intervals. Another assumption is that shocks to voters’ preferences can cause upsets in 
elections (Alesina and Roubini, 1992). 
 
Costly economic fluctuations can be minimised by cooperation – with or without binding contracts 
– between the two parties. This cooperation makes both better off in the long term. A party that has 
been voted into power has therefore two options: first, maximise short-term benefits for its 
constituency, or second, cooperate with the other party for long-term benefits. The equilibrium with 
cycles is suboptimal. If the two parties decide to follow an identical policy, the cycle is avoided, i.e. 
the fluctuation of output and inflation would diminish, resulting in both constituencies being better 
off. This can be beneficial especially when frequently or drastically changing policies due to new 
administrations. 
 
In practice, this can be seen as a bargaining process in which the more popular party gets to suggest 
and get accepted a policy closer to its own view. Alesina shows that through repeated, closer 
cooperation between the two parties, volatility of policies can be reduced. This complete or partial 
convergence of the two parties’ policies can be the result of political competition if the interaction 
between the parties and voters is seen as an infinitely repeated game (Alesina, 1988). Complete 
convergence can be explained by the fact that if the candidates have concave objective functions, 
the welfare-maximising policy rule will cause complete convergence. This cooperation may or may 
not be sustainable, depending on the discount rates of the two parties, the degree of polarization of 
their preferences, and the relative popularity of the parties. 
 
2.5.  Exchange Rate Manipulation 
In addition to the more common models described above, attention has been given to the role of 
exchange rate policies. As stated by van der Ploeg (1989), the political business cycle models often 
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unrealistically assume that output-inflation trade-off levels can be adjusted almost instantaneously. 
However according to one point of view, an appreciation of the exchange rate cuts import prices 
and consumer prices immediately, and thus boosts real income immediately. If the government 
achieves high levels of output and real consumers’ wages, it is going to be popular at the polls. An 
appreciation of the exchange rate just before the election is an effective way to gain popularity since 
it quickly cuts inflation and increases income, while leaves undesirable effects on net exports, 
output and employment to be dealt with after the election (Dornbusch, 1987). As voters place more 
importance in the recent history, the sudden improvements in economic conditions make it 
appealing to vote for the incumbent. 
 
3.  Some Empirical Evidence on Economic Policies and Business Cycles 
3.1   The Political Business Cycles 
The model of Nordhaus (1975) makes the following predictions: (i) the politically determined 
policy choice will have lower unemployment and higher inflation than is optimal, and (ii) the 
optimal policy will lead to a political business cycle, with unemployment and deflation in early 
years followed by an inflationary boom as elections approach. He states that prediction (i) is 
difficult to test, however, (ii) is more obtainable. In Nordhaus (1975), nine countries were selected: 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom and the 
United States. These countries satisfy three important conditions set by Nordhaus: (a) that the 
government be chosen in periodic competitive elections, (b) that the government have sufficient 
economic control and sophistication to move the economy in the desired direction, and (c) that the 
voting function be myopic. 
 
Thereafter, the following hypothesis was tested: during an electoral period of length θ, the 
unemployment rate should rise in the first θ/2 years and fall in the second θ/2 years. Annual data 
(1947 to 1972) was gathered for the nine countries. Nordhaus (1975) found that for four countries – 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the UK – the political business cycles appears to be an implausible 
description. For two countries – France and Sweden – there seems to be some modest indications of 
the existence of political business cycles. Finally, for three countries, namely Germany, New 
Zealand and the United States, there are significant signs of the existence of political business 
cycles. 
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Nordhaus (1975) offers a concrete example of the existence of policies that seem to be aimed at 
keeping the incumbent party in power. During the Nixon administration in the United States, 
unemployment rose from 3.4 percent in the late 1968 to 6.0 percent in the late 1970 due to the fact 
that the Nixon “game plan” “called for a recession in the early part of the administration”. Then the 
administration announced it would curb the unemployment rate to 4.5 percent by late 1972. 
Although it did not fully succeed in this (since inflation was more stubborn than expected), it was a 
demonstration of the incentives to remain in power through the use of political tools. 
 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) test Nordhaus’ model on growth and unemployment by constructing a 
political dummy. They consider all the OECD countries which have been democracies in the 
sample period (1960 to 1987): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. In four countries – Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and 
New Zealand – at least one of the dummy coefficients is significant. In addition to these four 
countries, and two others (Australia and France, which have coefficients with an inconsistent sign, 
but are nevertheless significant), all other countries have insignificant coefficients. Alesina and 
Roubini also performed regressions on inflation. Following this, they conclude that only two 
countries, Germany and New Zealand, follow Nordhaus’ predictions both in the level of economic 
activity and the inflation rate. 
 
Paldam (1979) finds rather inconclusive evidence of the existence of the Nordhaus-styled political 
business cycles. McCallum (1978), Golden and Poterba (1980), Abrams et al. (1980), Beck (1982, 
1984), and Hibbs (1988) have all rejected the political business cycles theory. Alesina and Sachs 
(1988) argue that the above-mentioned Nixon administration case is the only one clearly supporting 
Nordhaus’ political business cycle model. In general, the political business cycle model by 
Nordhaus has been criticized for often being inconsistent in estimating real-life election outcomes. 
 
3.2.  Rational Political Business Cycles 
Galli and Rossi (2000) study both opportunistic and ideological cycles in 11 Western German 
Länder. They restrict their analysis to the period 1974-1994. Several budgetary variables are used: 
total expenditure, surplus/deficit, public administration, health care, education, roads and social 
 9
security. While partisan differences seem to play a very small role, the opportunistic model is 
supported to a degree. 
 
Veiga and Veiga (2007) test rational political business cycles models on data covering all 
Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979-2001. They aim to reveal whether 
incumbent politicians reduce taxes and increase municipal spending prior to elections in order to 
appear competent. Tax reductions and greater investments are observable during the incumbent’s 
tenure. However, budget deficits are not. This leads to informational asymmetry, which the 
incumbent is able to take advantage of. Thus, according to the model, mayors can appear more 
competent by omitting the state of local finances. Their findings support the rational political 
business cycles model. Municipal taxes decrease a year or two prior to election time, and are 
returned back to normal levels after the elections. The opposite happens with budget deficits and 
municipal spending. The magnitude of the cycle does not appear to depend on how much the 
municipal assembly supports the mayor. However, left-wing incumbents are prone to be more 
opportunistic than right-wing incumbents. 
 
3.3.  The Partisan Model 
In Hibbs (1977), a dynamic country-by-country time-series analysis is used to support the claims 
that partisan variation plays a role in a nation’s unemployment and inflation rates. He uses time-
series analyses of post-war United States and United Kingdom. The British political system is more 
useful for dynamic analysis due to the fact that the working class-based Labour party and middle 
class-based Conservative party are more distant ideologically than their American counterparts, the 
Democrats and the Republicans. However, the Democratic Party is known to be linked to organized 
labor, and lower income and occupational status groups, whereas the Republican Party concentrates 
more on the business world and higher income and occupational status groups. Hibbs expects to 
observe that there exists a downward movement in the unemployment rate during the tenures of the 
Labour and Democratic parties, and an upward movement in the unemployment rate during 
Conservative and Republican governments. 
 
Hibbs uses the Box-Jenkins approach to ARMA-model to estimate the hypothesized effects of 
government macroeconomic policies on the unemployment rate, net of trends, cycles and stochastic 
fluctuations in the unemployment time-series observations. The intervention-induced changes are 
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compared to the ARMA-specification, which serves as a benchmark.The hypothesis states that a 
shift in the political orientation in the United States and the United Kingdom brings about gradual 
changes in the unemployment levels – rising under Conservative and Republican, and declining 
under Labour and Democratic governance. Hibbs uses data on the unemployment rate from the 
beginning of 1948 to the end of 1972. The results are similar for both countries: there are clear 
differences in the policies of the competing parties. However, in the United States the effects of 
government macroeconomic policies in the unemployment rate are processed more slowly than in 
the United Kingdom. Hibbs states that the results are reasonable considering the fact that the 
economic and political environment in the United States is more decentralized and heterogeneous. 
A factor that is not taken properly into account in Hibbs’ model – which he admits – is the impact 
of the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars. During both of these wars, there was an increased amount 
of domestic fiscal stimulus that lowered the unemployment rate. In addition, thousands of men 
(many of whom were previously unemployed) were withdrawn from the civilian labour force to 
fight in the war. Since American participation in both wars took place during Democratic 
administrations, Hibbs added a “war” term to take the effects of it into account. 
 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) run regressions using a “permanent” partisan dummy and obtain results 
that indicate that a permanent difference in the inflation rate is linked to temporary deviations of 
output and unemployment from trend. Governments may end up in a sub-optimal equilibrium with 
an inflation bias if they are more concerned about growth and unemployment instead of inflation. 
This causes the inflation rate to remain high even after the economy has returned to its “natural” 
state. Carlsen (1997b) tests whether left-wing parties make more countercyclical fiscal policies, and 
uses panel data on 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 1992. His results support the partisan 
theory: the structural deficit is higher under left-wing governments while the unemployment is high. 
When the unemployment is low, the political orientation of the parties plays no role. 
 
3.4. Rational Partisan Model 
The political business cycle literature predicts that one should observe recessions in the beginning 
of any type of administration (Alesina, 1987). Towards the end of the administration inflationary 
expansion takes place. The prediction of Alesina’s rational partisan model is that in the U.S. one 
should observe recessions at the beginning of the Republican governance as opposed to the higher 
output growth and inflation rates at the beginning of the Democratic governance. In both cases, in 
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the later stage output remains roughly the same, with higher inflation during Democratic 
administration. Alesina and Roubini (1992) state, that there is strong evidence to support the 
rational partisan model compared to the political business cycle model. They estimate a weaker 
form of the rational partisan model by testing for temporary effects on real variables after actual 
changes of governments.  Countries with a two-party system or at least a distinguishable “left” and 
“right” are considered: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Canada. In addition, the test is conducted for some countries with a more 
fragmented system. They conclude that the results are very favourable to the rational partisan 
model. 
 
Alesina and Sachs (1988) test the model on post-Second World War United States data. Their 
findings are consistent with the model. For instance, they find that the growth rate of the GNP in the 
first half of Democratic administrations tends to be higher than in the second half, and vice versa for 
Republican administrations. Contrary to the predictions of the political business cycle model of 
Nordhaus, recessions did not take place during Democratic administrations in the United States 
between 1949 and 1984. On the other hand, each Republican administration had a recession soon 
after being elected. During the studied period, only two administrations do not fit the predictions of 
the rational partisan model: the second half of the Nixon administration and the entire Kennedy 
administration. The reason for the former was the monetary expansion in 1971-1972. The latter was 
due to a policy mix with expansionary fiscal policy and tight monetary policy. 
 
Note that Heckelman (2006) states that some of the evidence supporting the rational partisan model 
is due to Alesina himself, and that there are plenty of studies that do not generally support the 
model. Such studies include Sheffrin (1989) and Heckelman (2001).  
 
3.5. Exchange Rate Manipulation 
Due to its simplicity and immediate impact, exchange rate manipulation has been used by 
governments around the world. According to Dornbusch (1987), it has been used to gain popularity 
for Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Martinez de Hoz in Argentina, Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom, and Ronald Reagan in the United States. 
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4.  Conclusions 
Several models have been formulated to describe the political aspects of business cycles. Political 
parties and individuals choose their strategies such that they will maximize their chances of being 
voted into power or to remain in office for another term. Most of the models can be divided into two 
main groups: opportunistic and partisan. In opportunistic models, politicians are only interested in 
staying in power, whereas in partisan models policies are determined according to party goals. In 
addition, exchange rate manipulation has been used to gain popularity in the wake of elections. 
 
There is empirical evidence to support each of the models  - however, at varying degrees. In 
general, the partisan and rational partisan models have gathered the most support, whereas the 
original political business cycles model by Nordhaus has only had a limited amount of success. 
Exchange rate manipulation has also been used successfully. 
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